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 This project examines the impact of the growing Islamic public in Western democracies, 
namely in the context of third-party arbitration courts based on Shari'a law. The project 
examines the controversies surrounding the introduction of Shari'a law into Western legal 
systems through the non-territorial federalism of arbitration courts. 
 The research also analyzes reactions to Shari'a in Canada, the United Kingdom, and the 
United States, and local backlash against the presence of Shari'a in Western legal systems 
within the arbitrational context. To this end, the research takes into consideration political 
attitudes towards the Shari'a arbitration systems in each of the three countries, organized 
opposition to their presence, legislative attempts to limit or regulate their operation in the 
three countries, and the impact, if any, this has on the continued operation of Shari'a 
arbitration courts in Western democratic traditions in general. In determining the long-term 
prospects of the limited role of Shari'a law in Western legal traditions, the case study of each 
other three Western nations takes into account attempted regulatory measures, successful 
bans of Shari'a arbitration where they exist, key legislation related to arbitration rights in the 
countries concerned, court cases and caselaw impacting the right of Shari'a courts to operate 
in these legal contexts. 
Likewise, in order to offer an in-depth examination of the practice of Shari'a law and its 
interaction with democratic conceptions of law, it is necessary to understand the linguistic and 
etymological background of key terms pertaining to the Shari'a tradition. This will aid in 
providing a basis for understanding the fundamental philosophical substructure underlying 
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the widely varied conceptions of Shari'a thought. This project will also review literature 
relevant to the question of Shari'a law's relationship to liberal culture, including the 
commentary of contemporary academic experts on religious freedom, contemporary Muslim 
thinkers, and liberal Islamic thinkers from history, both to examine reactions, attitudes, and 
analysis of Shari'a as a philosophical tradition, and to offer examples of liberal Islamic thought 
to contrast the dogmatic and dictatorial stereotypes surrounding the practice of Shari'a law. 
 The project will also examine the practice of Shari'a law in modern and historical 
contexts to emphasize the importance of the prevailing political context that the tradition 
exists within, and will make the case that it is the prevailing political culture that determines 
whether or not the religious practice will take a moderate or fundamentalist form. This is a 
crucial question in the debate over whether or not Shari'a arbitration courts are compatible 
with democratic principles of justice. It will advance the argument that, in a liberal democratic 
society free of the influence of a radical political context, the practice of Shari'a will likewise 
reflect those liberal values. 
The project will examine the relationship between Shari'a and arbitration courts in the 
Western democracies where they exist, taking into consideration caselaw, key legislative acts 
pertaining to arbitration, and the current state of political affairs in those societies. Due to the 
current dynamics of arbitration-court legislation, Supreme Court rulings, and related political 
considerations, this project will advance the case that Shari'a arbitration courts present no 




Key Terms Pertaining to Shari'a 
 In order to more comprehensively understand the basis of the Shari'a tradition, it is 
necessary to understand key terms pertaining to Shari'a. The word Shari'a itself is laden with a 
wealth of meaning, and conveys the concept of a path to water, with the idea of a path 
representing the right and pure direction for a member of the Muslim faith to follow, and 
denotes the idea of cleanliness in religion and personal conduct, evoking the cleansing 
properties of water.1 Terms also fundamental to understanding Shari'a are the sources from 
which it is chiefly derived, namely the Holy Qur'an, and the Sunnah. The Holy Qur'an is the 
central sacred text of Islam, and its etymological meaning conveys the idea of a “recitation,” 
emphasizing that the Prophet was reciting the words of God. The Sunnah which means 
“habitual practice” details the life, teachings, and sayings of the Prophet Muhammad. Another 
key term is fiqh, which means “comprehension” or “understanding,” and is used to describe 
the rulings of Islamic scholars (mufti) on a given question regarding the Holy Qur'an or 
Sunnah. It is these rulings which offer the basis for local understandings of Shari'a. Critical 
debate between mufti on the best understating of Islamic law to be derived from these 
sources is responsible for producing the wide variety of forms that Shari'a can take, and is 
known as ijtihad (“effort”). These debates can become contentious, and even lead one mufti to 
accuse another of takfir (heresy or apostasy), though the tradition of ijtihad, when not 
impacted by prevailing political forces, tends to offer a certain latitude of thought within 
Islamic scholarship. Finally, siyasa (“governance”) forms the political side of any Shari'a legal 
                                                 
1 Shari'a . Encyclopedia Britannica . 
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system, and is meant to offer Muslims a just and moral system in which to live. However, the 
definition of this term, in many contexts, is flexible enough to be true in many different kinds 
of government. 
Introduction 
 In recent decades, increased communication technologies and improved transportation 
infrastructure have united different regions of the globe to a degree never previously seen. 
With these advances have come new opportunities in international commerce, diplomacy, and 
intellectual discourse. Likewise, increased interchange between different areas of the world in 
the form of immigration has led to the commingling of cultural spheres that were previously 
separated by geography. One of the most significant impacts of this new interconnectivity in 
Europe and North America is the introduction of a significant number of new residents of 
Islamic background, who possess cultural perspectives that are in some way unique from 
those of the majority of the populace in those countries. Western legal systems developed 
during the Enlightenment, which have traditionally separated religious doctrine from law and 
public policy, are faced with a new set of circumstances whereby some residents of Islamic 
background elect to solve civil disputes according to the principles of their faith rather than 
the conventional procedures of civil law. While some members of the Islamic communities of 
Western nations such as the United States and United Kingdom have recoursed to informal 
Shari'a religious courts for some time, some Western nations have taken steps to formalize 
supervised Shari'a councils as recognized legal arbitration courts whose rulings may be 
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enforced by the standard justice system.2 Predictably, this has caused controversy in some 
circles, as some members of the public have raised concerns about the implications of faith-
based arbitration systems being integrated into standard legal practice. 
  This project examines the growth of Islamic faith-based arbitration courts, the debate 
over their formalization, and the reaction of the public towards those Shari'a arbitration 
courts, in an effort to determine whether or not the issue has contributed to a broadly 
negative backlash against the Islamic communities residing within the Western countries 
where this debate is currently occurring, namely Britain, Canada, and the United States. This 
project also attempts to determine whether or not Shari'a law and courts are in fact 
compatible with the traditional conventional legal practices in these countries, which tend to 
eschew spirituality from their deliberations in favor of established law or precedent. In order to 
understand all facets of the complex relationship between Islam and democratic-
constitutional law, both in the context of domestic Shari'a arbitration courts and in the arena 
of international politics, it will be necessary to examine not only the activities of the Shari'a 
arbitration courts in Western nations, but the historical factors impacting the development of, 
and attitudes towards liberal thought in the Islamic world. Finally, it will be necessary to 
analyze the relationship between perspectives of Islamic theology and liberal values such as 
freedom of speech, freedom of religion, and equal protection of the law. Through these means 
it will be determined that while Islamic third-party arbitration courts may present an 
                                                 
2  William, Arsani An Unjust Doctrine of Civil Arbitration: Sharia Courts in Canada and England. Stanford 
Journal of International Relations 
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intimidating problem for some observers in the West, and their future is for that reason 
uncertain, there is nothing necessarily contradictory between democratic principles and the 
practice of government-monitored third-party religious arbitration courts based on certain 
understandings of Shari'a law. 
 The relationship between law and religious tradition in the traditionally-defined 
Western world, has, since at least the time of the Enlightenment, been one of mutual wariness, 
as jurists have fiercely debated the definition and limits of religious freedom, and viewed with 
skepticism the interactions between religion and government, particularly when that 
interaction involves the encroachment of religious ideology within secular law and the 
interference of secular law with religious liberties. Since the social and legal upheavals of the 
Enlightenment, the question of whether religion should play an explicit role in legal 
procedures has been largely regarded as settled, as most Western nations have adopted 
either formal or informal concepts of the separation between church and state. This 
separation ranges from Thomas Jefferson's “wall of separation” enshrined in American political 
thought, to the principle of Laïcité (government secularism and religious neutrality)3 
considered integral to French law. 
Given this longstanding legacy in Western democracies of mutually exclusive 
coexistence between religious doctrine and public laws of the state, the impact that modern 
transportation and communications technologies have had on the resurgence of the debate 
over the appropriate limits of interaction between religion and law arguably represents one of 
                                                 
3 The deep roots of French secularism. Henri Astier BBC News Online 
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the most unexpected developments of the 21st century, as hitherto the general trend has seen 
religion taking an increasingly less significant role in society and civil governance, let alone 
legal procedure. However, the increased interaction between the traditionally-defined West 
and the Islamic World has led to precisely that circumstance. 
 Likewise, the influx of immigrants from traditionally Islamic nations devoid of the 
overriding cultural heritage of secular legal thought has led specifically to demands that 
citizens of Islamic background be allowed to rely on Islamic law and customs rather than the 
secular laws and customs of their adopted countries. While other religious groups within these 
nations, such as Catholics and Jews, have long-standing arbitration courts of a similar nature, 
some observers and activists feel that the unique aspects of Shari'a law merit increased 
regulations on all such religious tribunals; in short, the Shari'a courts having typically been the 
focal point of activist campaigns against such faith-based arbitration courts. 
I: Shari'a and Democratic Thought 
(i.) Literature Review 
In the face of timely debates denouncing and defending Islamic legal traditions, Islamic 
affairs specialist Eric Chaumont of France’s National Center for Scientific Research notes that, 
in regards to what Shari'a law actually is, “There are a lot of misunderstandings right 
now...Sharia is literally the way, that is, the law, that God revealed in the Koran and which is 
binding on all Muslims. The ambiguity is that Sharia has never been implemented anywhere in 
the world. What is implemented are different interpretations of Sharia – what are called 
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Muslim laws, el-Fiqh – interpretations of the law which are strict to varying degrees.”4 
Chaumont furthermore notes that because of the highly subjective and contextual nature of 
Shari'a law, a legal system claiming to use Shari'a law as a source or inspiration need not 
adhere to any existing models or prior religious interpretations of it. In contrast to certain 
heavily theocratic-leaning states which claim to derive legal legitimacy from Shari'a law, other 
interpretations allow for the full interpretation of Western forms of law, which some Muslim 
scholars interpret as legitimate approximations of Shari'a. In such situations, secular forms of 
law are granted religious legitimacy under more liberal interpretations of Shari'a law, 
demonstrating that certain forms of Shari'a could arguably coexist with a democratic 
constitutional system of law. Chaumont cites the example of Egypt, which, since President 
Anwar Sadat's regime of the 1970s, has claimed Shari'a as an important inspiration for its 
policies, with Sadat's regime later escalating the claim by asserting that it was the regime's 
only source of law. But, as Chaumont notes, “In reality, statutory law itself was not affected and 
the law implemented in Egypt today remains a law that is inspired by the French civil code, 
established under Napoleon.”5 Based on this dynamic, Caumont demonstrates that Shari'a law 
need not be held as mutually exclusive with more conventionally “secular” forms of civil law, 
given the highly elastic nature of what constitutes Shari'a law in the first place. 
Michael Curtis of the Gatestone International Policy Institute, a non-profit political 
think-tank based in New York, raises fears that the faith-based courts in Western Democracies 





will increase the influence of “Islamic extremists,” and asserts that these courts present “a 
challenge” to legal practice, by “the influence of religion in society, by differences over social 
issues such as women's rights, marriage, and divorce, and by the trend towards a legal system 
for Muslims, separate from the rest of the population.”6 In contrast, religious freedom and 
arbitration expert Dr. Michael Hefland, in an interview with Russia Today, argues that these 
fears are misplaced, noting that alternate forms of arbitration have worked “quite well” in the 
United States. at resolving excess disputes, alleviating stress on the court systems. Likewise, 
Hefland notes that Islamic arbitration systems have existed “for quite some time” informally 
along with many other forms of arbitration, without the projected problems or significant 
controversy. Furthermore, he notes that religious arbitration courts in the United States are 
required to abide by the standards set by U.S. law, and that in general such courts have 
cooperated with those standards. “In order to have your awards enforced you have to satisfy 
our minimum standards for certain types of well-being, conduct, and a variety of other things, 
and that means religious tribunals of all different types know what the ground rules are. And 
they embrace the ground rules and in turn what you get is arbitrational awards that work 
quite well in the American legal system.” Like Chaumont, Hefland predicts that such systems 
will typically conform to the larger court system of their host nation rather than influence it in 
a meaningful way. 
  Legal expert Dr. Almas Khan, writing for the Chicago Journal of International Law, notes 
that a formalized Shari'a arbitration system would offer certain benefits for new citizens of 
                                                 
6 Curtis, Michael. The Problem of Sharia Law in Britain. Gatestone Institute.org 
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Islamic background, namely a familiar form of law for recent Muslim immigrants “not 
acclimated to the secular court system and thus wary of it... formalized shariah tribunals would 
offer the best of both worlds---Islamic law with limited state monitoring. Muslim newcomers 
would also be more readily integrated...if they believed that their voice was represented in the 
formulation of laws.”7 In the arena of American political discourse, too, the issue of Shari'a 
court systems, and more generally the perceived influence of “Islamists” upon local laws, has 
inspired fiery rhetoric as some observers frame the issue as one of religious freedom and 
equality, while others regard any legitimization of Islamic law as fundamentally polemical to 
American values. Republican Senate hopeful Sharron Angle epitomized one extreme end of 
this spectrum, asserting that certain towns in the United States with a high density of Muslim 
citizens were in danger of becoming theocratic---and that “Frankford, Texas, and Dearborn, 
Michigan, were both subject to a sharia regime, as a result of the 'militant terrorist situation' 
that existed in those places.”8 In the United Kingdom, public protests against the perceived 
imposition of Shari'a law on British soil have garnered the support of both nationalists groups 
such as the English Defense League, and self-described “moderate” Muslims under the banner 
of the One Law for All organization.9 Other British Muslim organizations have publicly 
demonstrated in favor of the Shari'a arbitration courts, contending that there is nothing 
inherently immoderate about the forms of Shari'a practiced in the West.10 Proponents of the 
                                                 
7  Khan, Almas The Interaction between Shariah and International Law in Arbitration. Chicago Journal of 
International Law Volume 6 | Number 2 Article 16 
8  Whose law counts most? The Economist. October 2010. 
9  Muslims rally for Sharia law in UK, prompting nationalist protests. Russian Times.  June 2010. 
10  Ibid. 
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Shari'a courts in the United Kingdom point out that under the Arbitration Act of 1996, 
alternative forms of dispute resolution are both legal and enforceable under higher law---and 
that there is no precedent for excluding Shari'a courts so long as all aggrieved parties agree to 
abide by its rulings, and the rulings do not violate British law.11 
While scholarly theories of Islamic law prevailing within repressive autocratic regimes 
tend to prop up the political status quo, those interpretations originating from outside the 
sphere of influence of such regimes are extremely varied in terms of their political leanings 
and implications. In the context of Western constitutional democracies, scholarly 
interpretations of Islamic law display a greater variety than is common in many areas of the 
Islamic world, with some heavily right wing scholars endorsing militaristic and repressive 
versions of Islamic teaching commonly seen in repressive regimes, and others favoring a more 
moderate and liberal approach that seeks to reconcile democratic principles with those of the 
Islamic faith. The former view is epitomized in the person of British Imam Abu Hamza al-Masri, 
an Islamic activist and mufti notorious for endorsing the extremist position of Shari'a 
scholarship. Al-masri leads the extremist Muslim activist organization Supporters of Shari'a,12 
and has repeatedly stretched the limits of freedom of speech by preaching that true Shari'a 
must incorporate antisemitism. His supportive statements towards terrorist attacks led to calls 
for his deportation from the UK, and he was ultimately arrested for soliciting the murders of 
                                                 
11  Matthew Hickley,  Islamic Shari'a Courts in Britain are now “Legally Binding.” Daily Mail. September 
2008 
12  Philip Sherwell. Abu Hamza verdict: The hate preacher of Finsbury Park who tried to plead he was a 
friend of the West. 
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non-Muslims, and passing information to a suspected terrorist operative to aid in a planned 
attack. Subsequently, after evidence emerged the Al-Masr had been involved in a number of 
terrorist activities on American soil, including attempted recruitment and training, he was 
extradited to the United States, convicted, and is currently serving a life sentence in a New 
York correctional facility.13 
On the other end of the spectrum of Shari'a law interpretation is Turkish-born American 
mufti Fethulah Gülen, who offers an alternative interpretation of Shari'a, based on more 
moderate readings of Islamic religious texts. Drawing on Quranic passages speaking of the 
absolute necessity of permitting individuals to have freedom from compulsion to follow a 
given religion, Gülen argues that Shari'a binds Muslims to respect the concept of religious 
freedom.14 In stark contrast to the more narrow and dogmatic readings offered by 
fundamentalists like al-Masri, Gülen and his fellow moderates argue that the majority of 
Islamic principles can in fact be reconciled with democratic principles and Western law. In fact. 
Gülen states that “95% percent of Islamic teachings” can be reconciled with Western 
principles, and that the “remaining 5% are not worth fighting for,” being nonessential to the 
practice of the Islamic faith.15 Indeed, the comparison between different ideological camps of 
mufti as regards the proper interpretation and execution of Shari'a in the context of Western 
nations reveals a divide on many fundamental issues, including women’s rights, political 
secularism, and attitudes towards armed religious warfare, with the views endorsed by 
                                                 
13  Ibid. 
14  Questions and Answers about Islam (Vol.1) M. Fethullah Gulen Published: 2000 
15  Ibid. 
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mainstream and moderate mufti more frequently resembling the views of the wider public of 
the country in which they reside in. In contrast, fundamentalist mufti such as al-Masr typically 
make no argument that their conception of Shari'a is reconcilable with, or should be 
reconciled with, the democratic principles prevailing in the West. 
Another significant aspect of Shari'a practice in the West is the fact that the ideological 
conflict between moderate and fundamentalist mufti is even taking place. The greater 
freedom afforded by liberal principles of free speech has rekindled a long-dormant legalistic 
debate within the Muslim community over the fundamental nature of what role Shari'a should 
play in the civic lives of Muslims, in a manner that has been all but stifled in many regions of 
the traditionally-defined Islamic world. Unlike many of their counterparts living under 
monarchies and autocracies in the traditional Islamic world, mufti residing in Western 
democracies do not feel obliged to adhere to a specific religious narrative tailored to bolster 
the legitimacy of a regime. 
While debating the nature of Shari'a and the proper interpretation of religious texts 
with respect to political and social rights can result in a literal death sentence for religious 
scholars within nations such as Saudi Arabia, the principles of government religious neutrality 
and free expression prevailing in many Western nations have resulted in something of a 
Renaissance for the tradition of political dialogue and debate within Islam. This tradition, 
known as  ijtihād, holds that religious and legal principles such as Shari'a must be subject to 
independent critical reasoning, and the religious and legal theories there derived must 
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likewise be subject to debate within the Islamic community.16 Because theological debate and 
dispute could threaten the theologically-derived legitimacy that many Islamic regimes seek to 
establish through the rulings of government-backed mufti, this tradition has long been absent 
from the practical day-to-day religious life of many modern Muslims. Regimes such as Saudi 
Arabia, as was seen in the mass-execution of early 2016, do not tolerate either political or 
religious principals out of line with those set by the regime, with “heresy” and “religious 
unorthodoxy” being grounds for prosecution if a religious leader is deemed to pose a 
significant threat to the ideology of the government. 
Speaking for the moderate ideological wing of the community of Western mufti, 
Fethulah Gülen argues that democratic societies do indeed offer Islam more protections than 
even an allegedly Islamic autocracy, and that Islam, in turn, presents no fundamental 
contradiction or threat to the principles of those democracies.   
In fact in a democratic society, the source of law is colorblind and free from 
ethnic prejudice. It promotes the...participation of individuals and society in 
decision making institutions ... Everybody should be allowed to express 
themselves... Also, members of minority communities should be allowed to live 
according to their beliefs. If these sorts of legislations are made within the 
norms of international law and international agreements, Islam will have no 
objection to any of these. No one can ignore the universal values that the Qur’an 
and the Sunnah have presented with regard to the rights mentioned above. 
Therefore, it is impossible to prove in any way that Islam opposes democracy.17 
 
                                                 




Paradoxically, therefore, some aspects and traditions of Islamic faith are more freely practiced 
outside the sphere of influence of self-described Islamic governments. For Islamic thinkers 
such Gülen, democratic nations where religious rights are protected under the auspices of 
constitutionally-assured religious freedom offer the opportunity for a more free and personal 
practice of Islam than is possible in many autocracies claiming to represent Islamic principles.  
  In some countries, notably the United Kingdom, there has been an increasing reliance 
in the Muslim community on a relatively extensive system of alternate arbitration courts 
operating under the standards of Shari'a law; under the Arbitration Act of 1996, the rulings of 
these courts can be enforced by the standard court system, including the High Court of 
Justice, the United Kingdom's equivalent of the United States Supreme Court.18 This has led, 
understandably, to mixed reactions within Western nations with growing populations of 
Muslim citizens. in the debate over the government formalization of Shari'a law, the Islamic 
community has been subject to frequent accusations that it is attempting to illegitimately 
import foreign cultural customs into the framework of Western law. Some observers have 
raised fears about the practice of polygamy among some members of the Islamic community, 
arguing that these marriages19 are not recognized by legal authorities and may leave women 
without full legal rights in the event of a divorce.20 Shari'a courts, and Shari'a customs in 
general, these commentators argue, are components of this culture of inequality, and must 
                                                 
18  Taher, Abul (2008-09-14). "Revealed: UK's first official sharia courts". London: Times Online. 
Retrieved 2010-01-04. 
19  Harley, Nicola. Rise in Sharia marriages prompts polygamy fears. The Telegraph. July 2015. 
20  Ibid. 
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therefore not be permitted equal status under the laws of Western countries. However, on the 
issue of polygamy, some Muslim commentators retort that the prevalence of illicit 
polygamous unions within the Western Islamic community is overstated, arguing instead that 
the prevalence of unregistered marriages among the Muslim community stems from unequal 
treatment regarding matrimonial registration. Writing for The Telegraph newspaper, journalist 
Myriam Francois-Cerrah notes this discrepancy: “While Christian couples who marry in a 
church, or Jewish couples who marry in a synagogue find their marriages automatically 
recognized under UK law, Muslims, Sikhs, Hindus and other religious groups are not afforded 
the same recognition, requiring them to undertake a separate, civil ceremony.”21  
Another particularly contentious aspect of the debate is the fact that Shari'a courts 
have decided sensitive issues such as domestic disputes and domestic abuse cases. Such 
observers argue that arbitration tribunals based on the principles of Shari'a law are inherently 
weighed against women; they point to specific cases where Shari'a law arbitration courts have 
addressed domestic abuse by obliging the offending party to take anger management 
courses.22 Muslim Lawyer Sheikh Faiz-ul-Aqtab Siddiqi, a chief proponent and organizer of 
Shari'a Courts in Britain, counters that such Shari'a rulings, far from disenfranchising women, 
are designed to repair dysfunctional marriages and oblige abusive husbands to amend their 
behavior without dissolving the family.23 Inayat Bunglawala of Muslim Council of Britain notes 
                                                 
21  Francois-Cerrah, Myriam Sharia marriage in the UK is not toxic - polygamous men are. The 
Telegraph. July 2015 
22  Ibid. 
23  Ibid. 
17 
 
that the movement against the implementation of Shari'a arbitration courts on these grounds 
is relatively unique; Jewish arbitration tribunals, known as Beth Din Courts, have operated in 
the United Kingdom for over a century, rendering decisions on family law and other forms of 
civil dispute according to the principals of Jewish theology.24 All such courts, Bunglawala 
concludes, are further protected in Britain under the Arbitration Act of 1996. This rationale 
could likewise be extended to the practice of Shari'a law arbitration in other Western nations, 
notably the United States, which also enforces the rulings of arbitration courts under the 
Federal Arbitration Act of 1925.25 Within the United States, both Christian and Jewish 
arbitration courts have been a long-term part of the legal landscape. 
While the United States and other Western nations are, due to government-sanctioned 
arbitration courts, seeing a rise in non-territorial entities, it is worth noting that Shari'a law 
itself is in fact designed to operate within a partially non-territorial federal system, where a 
pluralistic arrangement of the secular national government and non-territorial religious 
schools of thought offer two parallel forms of legal guidance. From the perspective of 
traditional Islamic modes of governance, a kind of non-territorial federalism between secular 
and religious law is fundamental to a well-functioning society. This form of legal pluralism 
divides law into two distinct realms, that of secular law, known as Siyasa, and religious rulings, 
known as fiqh. Islamic legal scholar Asifa Quraishi-Landes of the University of Wisconsin 
describes the system in detail: “Fiqh sets out rules and guidelines for living a good Muslim life, 
                                                 
24  Ibid. 
25  The Economist. Whose law counts most? October 2010. 
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based on interpretations of Muslim scripture (the Quran and the life of the Prophet 
Muhammad) by religious legal scholars...Siyasa is a very different animal. It is not about 
directing Muslim lives. Rather, siyasa laws are created by the rulers of a society in order to 
organize that society efficiently and safely.”26  
Additionally, in recognition of the fact that the religious aspects of Shari'a law are 
debated and interpreted differently by various schools of thought within Islam, Quraishi-
Landes states that under proper Islamic governance, no religious ruling in a dispute is legally 
binding unless the parties involved agree to take their complaint to the secular government.27 
“...A married couple following the Hanafi school would get a different answer about their legal 
grounds for divorce than a couple who went to a Maliki legal scholar... the answer from the 
Maliki or Hanafi legal scholar (called a fatwa) is not binding in itself...And this is done entirely 
in the private realm. The only time a fiqh rule is imposed by the state is when the parties 
cannot resolve their conflict with just a fatwa, and they seek out state-enforced resolution.”28 
The secular government of Islamic countries under this dual system, while otherwise barred 
from interfering in religious rulings (and vice versa) nonetheless must rely ultimately upon 
Islam's holy text to form the basis of law. In a certain sense, the Qur'an, hadiths, and other holy 
texts of the Islamic faith are to Quraishi-Landes' traditional Muslim government what the 
Constitution is to the United States legal system; the writ basis on which legislation of every 
                                                 
26  Quraishi-Landes ,Asifa. How to create an Islamic government – not an Islamic state. Middle East Eye. 
Friday 17 February 2017 
27  Ibid. 
28  Ibid. 
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kind must reference and respect as the ultimate authority in lawmaking. As with the United 
States Constitution, the Muslim holy texts referenced by Shari'a law are interpreted and 
understood in many different ways, generating rival schools of thought that are as 
fundamentally contentious as Originalists and Living Constitutionalists are in the realm of 
American legal scholarship. 
  As quasi-legal actors in the extended civil justice system Shari'a courts and other 
arbitration courts occupy a unique niche in political theory. While Federalism is generally 
characterized by a sharing of power between state and local government entities, authorized 
sources of third-party legal arbitration share a small part of that authority, and use it to serve 
the legal disputes of a population that is not specifically linked to any kind of official 
geographic jurisdiction. This has led to a novel paradigm whereby third-party arbitration 
courts and religious tribunals, practically speaking, share in the larger equation of federalism, 
with their rulings (if legal) being enforceable by the government, by virtue of the Arbitration 
Act. While state and local courts serve a designated locality, and federal courts serve the 
national government, arbitration courts are not bound to any specific political-geographic or 
administrative locale, but rather serve individuals on a voluntary, contractual basis, sometimes 
related to a belief system as in the case of Shari'a and other religious arbitration courts. As 
government-sanctioned non-governmental players in the civil justice system, arbitration 
courts, particularly religious arbitration courts, raise distinct questions about the role such 




(ii.) Shari'a and Theories of Federalism. 
While advocates of such non-territorial systems can point to the well-established 
benefits to the official court system in the detouring of official cases to third-party entities, 
there is a predictable uneasiness in some quarters regarding the implicit sharing of authority 
with non-territorial entities, particular those associated with a system as distrusted and poorly 
understood as Shari'a law, as demonstrated in the campaigns against Shari'a courts. On the 
state government level, fear of Shari'a law's influence on judicial systems is reflected in the fact 
that fears of state judges “consulting” Shari'a law in their decisions has resulted in thirty-four 
states considering “foreign law” bans, with two dozen states having actually passed such 
laws.29 This legislation serves as useful barometer of how many state governments may feel 
about the sharing of legal authority with an alternate system of semi-legalistic values like 
Shari'a law. Indeed, in the official state and federal courts, such legislation would appear 
redundant, given the Establishment Clause's preexisting prohibition of religious teaching 
being established as American law---a constitutional requirement which was applied to the 
states under the Incorporation Doctrine in the twentieth century, rendering additional 
legislative bans more of a symbolic gesture than an impactful law. However, while this 
expression of displeasure is one that can be enacted within the context of the official system, 
non-territorial third-party entities that have been introduced into the equation of American 
federalism by the Arbitration Act are, for the time being, largely exempted from these 
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legislative countermeasures. So long as the parties resorting to the third-party tribunals are 
doing so of their own free will, and the rulings of the non-territorial tribunals are not 
themselves in violation of federal or state law, their determinations stand with legal force. 
II. Shari'a Law and Nation Case Studies 
(i.) The United States. 
Despite the precept of freedom of religion enshrined within Federal Law, and 
longstanding acceptance of various kinds of religious arbitration courts, the issue has been no 
less contentious in the United States than in the United Kingdom and other countries. In some 
quarters, notably on the American political right, Islamic arbitration courts represent a special 
case. While such observers regard longstanding Christian and Jewish arbitration courts as 
permissible components of the fabric of the nation's traditional religious culture, they view the 
introduction of Shari'a arbitration courts catering to the growing American Muslim community 
as tantamount to intrusion by an alien religious presence. Such sentiments have led sixteen 
U.S. States to ban judges from considering the precepts of Shari'a law in their rulings, in what 
critics have called at best a pointless remedy to a non-existent threat, and at worst a 
discriminatory exception to religious freedom.30 Legal expert Michael Hefland states that, 
ironically, the attempts at curbing the influence of Shari'a law in the U.S. are more often 
worrying then the rulings of nearly any Islamic arbitration court. He points to the specific 
example of Soleimani v. Soleimani, which saw an American Muslim woman bring her husband 
to a Kansas state court in an attempt to extract a mahr (dowery) fee of $677,000 he had 
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agreed to pay upon their marriage. 
However, despite the fact that the husband's signature was presented on a written 
contract agreeing to pay the dowry, the court ruled that the contract was invalid, citing a state 
law which forbade the consideration of “foreign law” in court, effectively pronouncing Islam a 
“foreign religion” and any contractual agreement signed according to the customs of Shari'a 
null and void.31 Interestingly enough, though the plaintiff did not appeal the decision, she 
could have arguably made a case that the Kansas state court had violated the Federal 
Arbitration Act in its decision, since the Supreme Court established in Prima Paint Corp. v. 
Flood & Conklin Manufacturing Co (1967) and Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury 
Construction Corp (1983) that the protections to arbitration agreements instituted under the 
Federal Arbitration Act is applicable in state and as Federal courts and the act does not, as 
Justice Black had stated in his dissent in Prima, solely apply to arbitration agreements 
pertaining to inter-state commerce, but to a wide variety of arbitration agreements. 
Likewise, the Court's decision in Southland Corporation v. Keating (1984) determined 
that due to the Supremacy Clause, state laws which contradicted arbitration agreements 
protected by the Federal Arbitration Act would be superseded: “Looking to and interpreting 
legislative history, the court stated that it was Congress' intent to create a substantive rule 
under the Commerce Clause that would be applicable in state and federal courts, and would 
preclude state laws that attempted to 'undercut' enforcement of arbitration agreements.”32 In 
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the context of American politics, these cases create a risky dynamic for state legislators and 
judges who oppose Shari'a arbitration courts in their rulings and policies. While the Shari'a 
courts are highly controversial, as arbitrational courts, they are arguably protected by both 
federal legislation and case law. 
Given the inherently religious nature of Shari'a arbitration courts, and their obvious 
interaction with the standard legal system, there are some inherent First Amendment concerns 
that would not be present in a secular arbitration court. Indeed, it could be argued that the 
legal system's enforcement of awards or penalties imposed by explicitly religious courts based 
on religious doctrines presents a violation of the Establishment Clause. The answer to this 
objection is complicated, given the unique relationship that has developed between religious 
tribunals, and the secular justice system. In practice, for example, United States courts have 
tended to enforce arbitration awards by religious tribunals, treating them like any other 
arbitration case, focusing on the contract made rather than the topic it concerns, and thus 
superficially avoiding the religious aspect of given cases altogether.33 Writing in the Boston 
University Law Review, Michael Hefland notes, “when reviewing [religious] arbitration awards, 
courts are tasked simply with ensuring that the arbitrators’ decision was issued pursuant to an 
arbitration agreement between the parties and that the arbitrators complied with the 
statutorily mandated procedural requirements.”34 This, as Hefland notes, creates a peculiar 
paradigm whereby United States courts, when faced with the case of an Imam who has been 
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accused of preaching sermons that violated Islamic teaching, will refuse to hear the religious 
case on Establishment Clause grounds---but will readily enforce the decision of a religious 
arbitration court that imposes a financial penalty on the Imam for the same reason.35 
Insulating First Amendment concerns by focusing only on whether an arbitration 
agreement was formed by the concerned parties, regardless of any religious content, has been 
the standard procedure for courts faced with religious tribunals' decisions. This basic standard, 
which is known as the Neutral Principles doctrine, was affirmed by the Supreme Court in Jones 
vs. Wolf (1979). In Jones, the Court noted that though it could not directly interfere with 
religious doctrines and practices due to the First Amendment, it was perfectly entitled to 
adjudicate in disputes where legally agreed-upon rules, contracts, or bylaws of an 
organization had been violated. “The primary advantages of the neutral-principles approach 
are that it is completely secular in operation, and yet flexible enough to accommodate nearly 
all structures of religious organization and administration.. The method relies exclusively on 
objective, well-established concepts of trust and property law familiar to lawyers and judges. It 
thereby promises to free civil courts completely from entanglement in questions of religious 
doctrine, administration, and practice.”36 Here again, the standard legal procedure for 
addressing the violation of agreements involving religion has typically adopted the tactic of 
focusing on whether an agreement was in fact made, and more or less ignoring the religious 
context it was made in. For this reason, Shari'a arbitration courts are fairly unlikely to run afoul 
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of the First Amendment. 
ii.) Canada 
In Canada, the debate over Shari'a arbitration courts is colored by a different 
understanding of religious freedom. As in the United States, Canada has not seen any 
overriding ban on Shari'a law on the national level, but has seen strong opposition and some 
regional bans on the application of Shari'a law, even if the manner in which Shari'a rulings are 
applied arguably conforms to Canadian law. The debate reached particular prominence in the 
Province of Ontario in 2004 when Toronto lawyer and Muslim community organizer Syed 
Mumtaz Ali announced that an organization dubbed the Islamic Institute of Civil Justice would 
begin dispensing arbitrational rulings on civil disputes and family law based on the principles 
of Shari'a law.  
Over the next twenty months, the debate over the proper limits of religious freedom 
and secular neutrality within Canadian legal practice would continue unabated, with the 
supporters of the arbitration courts facing organized opposition by some women's groups,37 
who repeated the oft-cited argument alleging that Shari'a law stripped women of their rights, 
and that the families of some Muslim women might pressure them to use Islamic tribunals. 
The issue was eventually resolved by an all-encompassing ban on alternative arbitration 
tribunals that made decisions based on anything other than Ontario or national law, 
effectively outlawing religious tribunals of all varieties, including Christian and Jewish 
arbitration courts that had operated without controversy since 1991. While some other 
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religious groups were upset by the bans, Islamic organizations had particular cause for 
consternation, as the bans, though universal to religious arbitration tribunals, came into being 
when the potential for Islamic arbitration courts in Ontario became a realistic possibility. 
Indeed, the concern over the establishment of Shari'a arbitration courts in Ontario, and 
the ensuing controversy, ultimately superseded the original rationale for permitting the 
arbitration courts in the first place. The court system of Ontario, like many regional and 
national courts across the Western world, was suffering from a high degree of backlog as the 
justice and arbitration system struggled to serve the demands of an unprecedentedly large 
population.38 The formalization of religious arbitration courts in 1991 was intended to redirect 
specific varieties of civil disputes away from the normal court system, thereby alleviating a 
portion of the justice system's case-load.39 The elimination of all religious arbitration courts in 
the province, therefore, demonstrates that some Ontarians would prefer to forego the benefits 
that religious tribunals of all varieties provide for the larger court system than permit the 
establishment of Shari’a tribunals in their province. The comparative lack of controversy 
surrounding religious arbitration tribunals prior to the proposed establishment of Shari'a 
courts demonstrates that Shari'a itself is likely the point of controversy. As in the United 
Kingdom and the United States, the suppression of Shari'a law in Ontario raises the question 
of if, and to what degree, anti-Islamic sentiment influences the movement against Shari'a 
arbitration courts, and whether such opposition represents a reaction to the specific content 
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of Shari'a tribunal rulings, or if systemic societal bias against Islam is the chief motivating 
factor, given the general tolerance of and lack of opposition to other arbitration courts that 
lack religious influence. 
III. The Source of Radicalism: Faith or Politics? 
(i.) The Importance of Politics in Shaping Religious Practice 
Apart from the sentiments towards Shari'a prevailing within Western countries hosting 
significant Muslim immigrant populations, another front on the debate between Islamic 
thought and Western conceptions of law extends within the Islamic community itself. The 
Islamic community in the West presents a paradoxical dichotomy between fully acclimated 
and educated Muslim citizens who are highly accepting of the democratic legal thought 
prevailing in their country, and those immigrants who have arrived more recently, perhaps 
from a less rigorously educated background, who view Western conception of law with 
varying degrees of wariness, fearing bias or erasure of their own cultural identity.40 
Additionally, the rapid modernization of some Muslim immigrants' countries of origin has 
resulted in a contemporary paradigm where Muslim immigrants from these countries embrace 
far more traditional attitudes than their co-religionists from more developed areas of the 
Islamic world; Muslim immigrants hailing from post-colonialist nations where local application 
of democratic theory is in its infancy may be more suspicious of such political philosophies. 
It would be remiss to overlook the practical status of the development democratic 
governments throughout much of the Islamic World. Historically, the Islamic world has been 
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comparatively slow to transition from pre-democratic forms of government, and the 
hegemony of militaristic autocrats and traditional monarchies remained largely unquestioned 
until the wave of Arab Spring Revolutions beginning in 2011. Of the six absolute monarchies 
extant in the modern era, (Vatican City, Brunei, Swaziland, Saudi Arabia, Oman and Qatar and 
the United Arab Emirates) five are Islamic majority nations.41 It is also noteworthy that certain 
other Islamic states embrace variations of monarchical or stratocratic government systems 
which largely preclude the populace's participation in the legislative process. Iran, for instance, 
operates as a constitutional theocracy, where Islamic scholars oversee much of the legislative 
process. 
Another symptom of the ways the Islamic world has trailed behind its peers in the West 
in terms of democratic development is the comparative prevalence of draconian and 
archaic laws in certain Islamic nations. In Indonesia, for instance, regional laws criminalize 
homosexuality and specify a penalty of one hundred lashes,42 while in Yemen, Mauritania, 
Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Sudan, and some regions of Somalia, homosexual acts carry the death 
penalty. Qatar imposes the death penalty on heterosexual couples who engage in 
premarital sex, and in many conservative countries within the Islamic world, public displays of 
affection such as kissing and holding hands can result in fines, imprisonment, and other civil 
penalties. Indonesia specifies that "passionate" kissing in public can be punished with up to 
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five years in prison,43 while the United Arab Emirates deports foreign expatriates guilty of lewd 
behavior.44 Even some highly advanced and wealthy first-world nations within the Islamic 
world cling to severe legal standards that have been discarded in many other regions of the 
world. In Saudi Arabia, the death penalty can be inflicted for certain non-violent offenses such 
as the sale and smuggling of illegal narcotics, as well as for homosexuality. Indeed, the human 
rights organization Amnesty International recorded 151 instances where executions were 
sentenced and carried out in the Saudi justice system in 2015, compared to 35 instances in the 
United States in the same year. 
Even more controversially, Amnesty International notes that certain ideological and 
religious offenses are theoretically punishable with the death penalty within the Saudi 
Kingdom, including blasphemy, apostasy, homosexuality, and adultery. In 2008, Saudi Arabian 
authorities made international headlines with their arrest of Ali Hussian Sibat, a popular 
Lebanese-born talk show host known for predicting the fortunes of listeners who called his 
program.45 Sibat was convicted on charges of sorcery and sentenced to death by beheading in 
a trial unusual in the context of a first-world country in the 21st century. Under international 
pressure, the Saudi Supreme Court overturned the sentence and released Sibat in 2010.46 
Amnesty International notes that Saudi authorities continue to prosecute dozens of 
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individuals for sorcery every year, with the last reported execution for sorcery occurring in 
2007, when Egyptian-born pharmacist Mustafa Ibrahim was convicted and beheaded for 
desecrating a Qur'an and allegedly practicing witchcraft.47 For a variety of charges, capital 
punishment within Saudi Arabia is routinely performed through traditional and anachronistic 
methods, including firing squads and beheading, and occasionally stoning and crucifixion for 
certain religious and ideological offenses.48 
The development of women's rights within much of the Islamic world varies from nation 
to nation, with highly conservative Muslim-majority states such as Saudi Arabia and Iran 
presenting a comparable deficit in women's rights, with required male guardianship in public, 
a strictly enforced Islamic dress code, inability to travel without the consent of male guardians, 
and comparatively limited rights to marry the partner of their choice, or obtain a divorce.49 In 
contrast, more liberal Muslim-majority nations such as Turkey have historically afforded 
women with most of the legal rights enjoyed by their peers in the West.50 In Iran, along with 
less developed Islamic nations such as Yemen, child marriages remain theoretically enshrined 
in the law, though in practice it is uncommon in Iran. 
While the status of democratic rights within the traditionally-defined Islamic world may 
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offer some insight into the context from which many recent Islamic immigrants to Western 
democracies derive their cultural perspectives, it is not a perfect metric for determining the 
compatibility between Shari'a forms of legal thought and Western forms of law within the 
realm of arbitration, given that each state within the Islamic world has a historical and social-
political context outside of Shari'a law that impacts the interpretations offered by religious 
scholars in the region. In this sense, it may be argued that those state within the Islamic world 
that support undemocratic or archaic policies have hijacked the legitimacy of Shari'a law 
within the Islamic world to prop up their own political customs and power structure. Indeed, 
states such as Saudi Arabia have been accused of assuming a mantle of religious piety for 
secular political ends, and persecuting the regime's political opponents with an interpretation 
of Shari'a law that permits it to condemn political enemies of the regime as violators of 
religious law. Vague charges of affronting Islam and “adopting a takfiri (heretical) approach to 
religion, contrary to the Sunnah and Qur'an” have been used as a justification to silence the 
ruling House of Saud's critics within both political and religious circles in the kingdom. 
The rulings of mufti are, in this sense, often used to justify repressive policies, and 
maintain the political and religious status quo. Fundamentalist mufti arguably form symbiotic 
relationships with autocratic governments; government regimes grant legal force to the 
rulings of religious scholars, who in turn imbue a theological varnish to the policies of the 
regime. Due to this religious-political dynamic, opposition groups who represent a threat to 
the political legitimacy of the regime often face double charges of criminal misconduct and 
heresy. One of the most notorious examples of this trend occurred in January of 2016, when 
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forty-seven Saudi activists led by popular Islamic religious leader and liberal pro-democracy 
activist Sheikh Nimr al-Nimr were convicted on charges of terrorism and religious 
unorthodoxy and sentenced to death following a string of peaceful protests against the 
autocratic governments of Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and Syria.51 Al-Nimr and his followers 
advocated for a peaceful transition to more democratic systems of government in the Middle 
East, and an increase in human rights, and furthermore suggested that portions of the Saudi 
Kingdom should secede if these ideals were not respected. Citing al-Nimr's supposed violation 
of the kingdom's religious laws and denouncing his movement as terrorism, the Saudi regime 
argued that the mass-execution was justified under Islamic principles, while other observers 
criticized the move as a transparent hijacking of Shari'a law to dispose of the regime's political 
opponents.52 
Similarly, Iran, Qatar, Yemen, Pakistan and other Islamic states arguably take full 
advantage of the highly elastic and subjective nature of Shari'a law in order to grant religious 
legitimacy to laws considered to fall below the standard of democratic human rights. It is 
arguable that the manner in which Shari'a is interpreted in certain Islamic nations most 
frequently falls into line with the political interests of the ruling regime, and is typically tailored 
to lend autocratic regimes an artificially inflated legitimacy in an age when such governmental 
structures are considered outmoded in much of the world. In this sense, the manner in which 
Shari'a is executed within the context of the Islamic world is arguably a poor test of whether it 
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is compatible with Western forms of law, or how Muslim scholars in the context of Western 
Shari'a arbitration courts might interpret religious texts when removed from the context of 
autocratic and monarchical regimes as exist in certain parts of the Islamic world. 
Furthermore, analyzing the manner in which democracy has exhibited a comparatively 
slow level of growth in the Islamic world, it is likewise necessary to factor in the demise or 
upset of numerous longstanding autocratic governmental structures in the Arab Spring 
Revolutions beginning in 2011. Upheavals within much of Islamic society saw the end of 
autocratic regimes in Tunisia, Libya, Egypt, and threatened the survival of others, notably Syria, 
which has endured five years of civil war as opposition forces seek to dissolve the government 
of Basshar al-Assad. While it avoided outright revolution, Saudi Arabia likewise experienced a 
number of protests in 2011-2012, which saw the deaths of several activists at the hands of the 
authorities, but ultimately did not seriously damage the regime's authority. 
While the waves of protests, revolts, and regime terminations prevailing over much of 
the Middle East and North Africa presented a profound reshaping of the political climate 
within certain Islamic countries, they also saw changes in the way Shari'a rulings were 
constructed and executed, as religious scholars supportive of fallen autocratic regimes 
increasingly lost influence. In Libya, the fall of Muamar Gaddafi's regime saw the rise of new 
interpretations of Sharia law comparatively more favorable towards democracy, clashing with 
the work of scholars of more conservative readings which had prevailed prior to the revolution 
of 2011.53 After Gaddafi's regime was dissolved in 2011, the National Transitional Council led 
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by Mustafa Abdel Jalil announced that the new government would use Shari'a as a source for 
its constitution, leading to some concerns among Western observers about the fortunes of 
democracy in a post-Gaddafi Libya, with some pointing to repressive states such as Saudi 
Arabia as functional examples of how Shari'a is executed in practice. However, as previously 
stated, the manner in which Shari'a is practiced in Saudi Arabia is the political result of one of 
many potential scholarly interpretations of Islamic religious texts---and paradoxically, the 
repressive political climate of Saudi Arabia is likely a key influence in promoting those 
interpretations, in a manner that permits the regime to draw upon the cultural legitimacy of 
Islamic theology to maintain the social status quo and stifle political opposition. In the 
question of whether or not Shari'a law can be consonant with the principles of Western-style 
constitutional democracy, it is necessary to address how a religious form of law like Shari'a 
could coexist with the purely secular and religiously neutral form of government prevailing in 
most Western nations. 
Likewise, while it is demonstrable that some of the autocracies claiming Islam as a 
source of legitimacy are not above discarding its more inconvenient traditions in the name of 
political expediency, it is necessary to address the nature of Shari'a's minimum role within 
society, given the relatively high number of those autocratic regimes claiming it as an 
inspiration in their policies. Fethulah Gülen asserts that while there are some observers both 
within and outside of the Islamic community who regard Shari'a as a primarily political aspect 
of Islamic teaching, these observers are mistaken, arguing that any interpretation of Shari'a is 
primarily a standard for Muslims to live by in their own religious lives, and it is not designed to 
35 
 
supersede or replace secular laws imposed by the greater society. He points out that Islamic 
societies down through history have relied upon secular government apparatuses to form and 
execute laws---even in the case of heavily theocratic states such as Saudi Arabia, which claim 
inspiration from Shari'a in its government's policies. “In Islam, the legislative and executive 
institutions have always been allowed to make laws. These are based on the needs and 
betterment of society and within the frame of general norms of law...Muslims have always 
developed laws. The community members are required to obey the laws that one can identify 
as “higher principles” as well as laws made by humans.”54 
He furthermore argues that any government that permits Muslims to reasonably 
practice their faith without interference is sufficient to compel Muslims to obey its laws. 
Muslims are by no means obliged to replace functional secular laws with theocratic ones, 
especially if their religious freedom receives greater protection in the context of a secular 
constitutional democracy. Gülen concludes: “In the presence of such a state, there is no need 
to seek an alternative state...In order to make such ideal laws, lawmakers should reform, renew, 
and organize the system according to the universal norms of law. Even if such a renewal is not 
considered tashri’i (based on Shari'a), it is not conceived of as being against it.”55 In principle, 
therefore, it is arguable that not every form of Shari'a necessarily promotes nondemocratic 
thought, even if Shari'a interpretations prevailing within theocratic autocracies tend to affirm 
the policies of those regimes---and, as previously stated, the dominance of autocratic regimes 
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and their influence on the development of Islamic legal thought may tend to artificially bolster 
theocratic mufti by suppressing others who refuse to cooperate with the regime. 
Another dynamic at play within the Islamic world, as previously intimated, is the legacy 
of colonialism, and the perception that democracy is a product of the secular West which is 
hostile the values indigenous cultures of the region. In many areas of the Islamic world, 
Muslim advocates of democracy are faced with the challenge of contending against the 
historical cultural memory of past experiences with democratic societies, which, unfortunately, 
have not always been positive. Due to competing political interests, Western democracies 
have, at times, contributed to the negative political dynamics prevailing in many parts of the 
Islamic world today. This has in turn contributed to a kind of besieged attitude in some parts 
of the Islamic world, which tends to further bolster the legitimacy of self-proclaimedly 
“Islamic” autocratic regimes, which can capitalize upon this negative historical legacy to 
demonize pro-democracy Islamic thinkers as cultural traitors. In order to understand all 
aspects of the Islamic world's relationship with democratic thought, it is necessary to 
understand these historical events and their impact on the perception of democratic ideals in 
some key Muslim-majority nations. 
(ii.) The Impact of Historical Politics on Islamic Perceptions of Democracy 
One of the most notorious and far-reaching examples of how political interactions with 
Western democracies has contributed to negative perceptions of democracy in some quarters 
of the Islamic world is found in the events leading up to the Islamic Revolution in Iran in 1979. 
Over the first half of the twentieth century, Iran experienced a whirlwind cultural and political 
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movement in favor of Westernization that brought the absolutist power of the Qajar 
Monarchy to an abrupt end, replacing it with a constitutional monarchy under Reza Shah in 
1925.56 In 1941, United Kingdom and USSR invaded Iran, following accusations that Shah's 
government was colluding with the Axis powers, despite Iran's declaration of neutrality. 
Ultimately, the British obliged Shah to abdicate in favor of his son Mohammad Reza Pahlavi in 
1941. Additionally, Iran entered into an arrangement with the Anglo-Persian Oil Company (a 
precursor to the modern British Petroleum Company) which was seen by many Iranians to 
overwhelmingly favor the British, who were likewise perceived to be using the oil company's 
assets in influence Iranian politics. Growing dissatisfaction with the constitutional monarchy's 
policies led to the rise of the Iranian National Front, which sought to transform Iran into a full-
fledged democratic republic. 
The election of National Front candidate Mohammad Mosaddegh to the office of Prime 
Minister of Iran in 1951 saw the introduction of wide variety of Western-inspired liberalization 
measures, including labor protection laws, the construction of Western-style universities and 
infrastructure, and a wide variety of other development projects aimed at realizing the 
National Front's vision of transforming Iran into a modern republic.57 His most controversial 
project was the proposed nationalization of the Anglo-Persian Oil Company's assets, which 
would placed Iran's fossil-fuel resources under the control of the Iranian government, and 
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beyond the reach of the British economy, which had benefited immensely under the previous 
agreement. In direct response to this event, the United Kingdom established itself as a strong 
opponent to the ascendant democratic movement within Iran. Likewise, the United States 
government, concerned that Iran had remained neutral in the Cold War standoff between 
NATO and the Warsaw Pact countries, perceived the democratic faction of Iran as a potential 
threat to U.S. interests in the region, particularly if they potentially chose to support the Soviet 
bloc.58 This fear was heightened to an ever greater degree when Mossadegh's government, in 
the face of British oil embargoes sending the Iranian economy into a state of near-collapse, 
successfully passed a referendum dissolving parliament and stripping the Shah of his 
remaining powers. 
Accordingly, the CIA and MI6 colluded to overthrow the elected members of the 
Iranian government, and quash the Iranian democratic faction before it achieve its goals of 
appropriating Iran's natural resources for the country's own use. The operation, known by the 
codename Operation Ajax, not only sought to interfere with the Iranian electoral process by 
bribing local officials, but also manufacture civil unrest and violence to undermine the 
authority of Mossadegh's government. Ultimately, Operation Ajax culminated in a full-fledged 
coup d'etat which saw Mossedagh arrested by Iranian monarchist and army General Fazlollah 
Zahedi, and the Shah's full powers being restored against the will of much of the country. 
Over the next three decades, the Shah's near-absolutist reign would be dogged by 
economic problems, accusations of brutality by his subjects, and the indelible stigma of being 
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an autocratic leader propped up by Western democracies. His restoration of Britain's 
considerable fossil-fuel privileges on Iranian soil likewise won him the further disdain of 
Iranian democrats and nationalists alike. Ultimately, Shah Pahlevi's dictatorial approach to 
modernization and secularization caused the galvanization of a nascent political faction of 
religious fundamentalists in Iran, and his lack of support from fellow secularists embittered by 
his Western-backed autocratic rule precipitated the Islamic Revolution of 1979, which 
instituted the theocratic government ruling Iran today. In 2013, CIA documents declassified 
under the Freedom of Information Act belatedly acknowledged the United States' intimate 
involvement in the Iranian coup of 1953,59 confirming the long-held accusations of Iranian 
political historians that the United States had played a key role in orchestrating the 
extinguishment of the democratic movement of Iran--a suspicion which had, unsurprisingly, 
caused many Muslims in the region to lose faith in Western forms of democratic government. 
Another major area of diplomatic abrasion between Middle-Eastern Muslims and the 
United States' foreign policy is the consistent support the United States has shown to Saudi 
Arabia's House of Saud. Indeed, economic interactions between the United States and the 
House of Saud in the 1930s arguably enabled the family to become power-brokers in the 
modern world, transforming them from an aristocratic but largely destitute Arab family whose 
fortunes were in apparent decline by the twentieth century, into an anachronistic but 
fantastically wealthy medieval-style Islamic monarchy before the dawn of the twenty-first 
                                                 




century. The arrival of American oil surveyors in the region in the early 1930s was a pivotal 
event in the history of the Islamic world; while part of the region now known as Saudi Arabia 
had long held religious significance as the location of the holy city of Mecca, the area had, 
until the 20th century, been something of a political backwater on the fringe of the Ottoman 
Empire. 
The discovery of Saudi Arabia's massive oil reserves by the American surveyors and the 
subsequent foundation of the Arab-American Company (ARAMCO) established the unlikely 
but enduring partnership between the United States and the Saudi Kingdom, which, over the 
course of the century, accrued unbelievable wealth due to the oil trade, enabling the Saudi 
monarchy to garner favor with its people by abolishing taxation. Additionally, the United 
States has consistently sold modern weaponry to the Saudi Kingdom, with the Obama 
administration offering to sell a total of $115 billion in advanced tanks, aircraft, and other 
military hardware to the monarchy over the course of President Obama's two terms in office. 
Additionally, both the Obama and Trump administrations have offered logistical and strategic 
support to Saudi Arabia's controversial war in the neighboring state of Yemen, which, though 
widely criticized as a pointless struggle that has caused a major humanitarian crisis in the 
region, is reflective of a long pattern of political and militaristic aid that the United States has 
offered its ally and oil trading partner.60 
The reasons that the United States' relationship with Saudi Arabia present a myriad of 
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problems for the perception of democracy in the region are as multi-faceted as they are 
unique to the politics of the region. The royal family of Saudi Arabia, while managing to 
maintain power into the modern era through the oil trade, nonetheless bears the dubious 
distinction of being despised by secularists, religious moderates, advocates of democracy, and 
radical fundamentalists alike across the Middle East, a near-unanimous hatred which colors 
much of the Islamic world's perception of the United States. The House of Saud has earned 
the ire of democratic reformers in the Islamic world, who loathe the regime's anachronistic 
governmental structures, which in the typical style of a feudal monarchy places members of 
the Saud clan in most important offices of government.61 Religious moderates in the Islamic 
world detest the brutality of the Saud regime, and the executions of peaceful Muslim 
dissidents such as the late Shiekh Nimr al-Nimr, who, as previously stated, was beheaded with 
forty-six of his fellow activists for speaking against the policies of the Saudi government. 
Secularists oppose the Saudi government's theocratic policies, its alliance with the militant 
Wahabist sect, and its persecution of atheists such as Raif Badawi, a Saudi blogger who in 
2016 was sentenced to ten years in prison and 2,000 lashes for tweets deemed blasphemous 
by Saudi athorities.62 
Most peculiarly, the Saudi royal family has made innumerable enemies among many if 
not most radical fundamentalists outside of the Wahabist sect. Non-Wahabist fundamentalists 
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often regard the supposed religiosity of the regime as a hypocritical front, and harbor a long 
list of grievances against the House of Saud. The fundamentalists point to the lavish 
Westernized lifestyles enjoyed by the Saudi oil-aristocracy, the numerous sex scandals that 
have rocked the sprawling royal family over the years, and the materialism and plutocracy that 
characterizes much of the government. Fundamentalists also object to the Saudi government's 
toleration of non-Muslims on the sacred ground where the Prophet Muhammed lived and 
preached, and were particularly outraged by the presence of non-Muslim military personnel 
on Saudi soil during the Gulf War, which they regarded as a profanation of holy ground.63 
Despised and beset on all sides by disparate ideological groups, and economically challenged 
by recent fluctuations in oil prices, the House of Saud can count few allies in the arena of 
world politics as influential as the United States---to the detriment of the United States' image 
in the region. Writing for the Atlantic newspaper, former CIA field director Robert Baer 
summed up the situation faced by the United States' monarchical Arab ally: “Saudi oil is 
controlled by an increasingly bankrupt, criminal, dysfunctional, and out-of-touch royal family 
that is hated by the people it rules and by the nations that surround its kingdom."64 
Given the widespread disdain for the Saudi royal family from most ideological quarters 
of the Middle East, it is perhaps unsurprising that the United States' diplomatic and economic 
relationship with the monarchy reflects badly on the image of the democratic values that the 
United States symbolically represents on the world stage. Even to religious moderates and 
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advocates of democracy in the region, the United States' alliance with the feudal regime 
presents a frustrating dilemma, as it undermines faith in the values of the democratic 
governments of the West that are offering support to a brutal, despised, and anachronistic 
monarchy in the Middle East. International organizations such as the United Nations have in 
recent years also contributed to the growing doubts of some quarters of the Islamic world in 
the veracity of democratic values, which, in the context of international politics, may 
sometimes appear to be a moral fig-leaf for the ambitions of self-interested nations. In 
October of 2016, for example, while the Russian Federation's representatives were effectively 
kicked out of the United Nations Human Rights Council over the country's annexation of 
Crimea and subsequent support for rebel factions in Ukraine, Saudi Arabia was re-elected to 
the same UN human rights council, this following a controversy in September 2015 which saw 
one of Saudi Arabia's representatives being appointed as the chairman of a panel that selects 
independent human rights experts.65 The Saudi Kingdom's re-election to the human rights 
council occurred despite the aforementioned mass-execution of peaceful pro-democracy 
activists at the start of the year, the consistent regressive persecutions of Islamic moderates, 
atheists, homosexuals, alleged “sorcerers”, etc., and the deaths of Yemeni civilians in the 
kingdom's ongoing war in that country. In the face of this, organizations such as the United 
Nations, which claims democracy as one its “core values and principles”66 have in their way 
served to further erode the confidence many Middle Eastern Muslims have in Western ideals 
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of democracy, negatively impacting the growth of democratic values in an Islamic world that 
witnesses Western democracy legitimizing and supporting a regional monarchy against the 
will of the inhabitants. 
(iii.) Does Shari'a or Politics Promote Fundamentalist Thought? 
In light of the clear regressive policies of certain regimes such as Saudi Arabia and Iran, 
it has been argued in certain quarters that Islam, Shari'a law, or both inevitably promote these 
forms of fundamentalist thinking. However, it is arguable that the form of Shari'a law, and the 
manner in which the Islamic faith is practiced, is more heavily influenced by the broader 
political context in which they exist. Governments, law systems, or non-territorial federal 
systems influenced by Shari'a law that exist within a more moderate or liberal political context, 
will, arguably, exhibit a proportionally moderate tone in many cases. As previously stated, the 
greater freedom of expression and religious conscience afforded in secular-democratic 
nations tends to stimulate the growth of different perspectives towards Muslim philosophy 
that would not be permitted to exist in many of the aforementioned autocratic regimes. 
Indeed, without the heavy administrative hand of a quasi-theocratic government that relies 
upon a specific narrative of the Islamic religion to promote its own legitimacy, the tradition of 
ijtihād typically produces a myriad of traditions, philosophies, and expressions of Islamic 
thought. 
Whereas the Saudi Arabian government enforces an extremely narrow range of Islamic 
philosophical belief, and tends to suppress liberal thought, democratic sentiment, and 
alternative perceptions of religion, Islamic communities within the West, when free of such 
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constraints, can fall into either the left or right of the political and social spectrum. As Dr. Kecia 
Ali of Boston University notes in the opening chapter of Sexual Ethics And Islam: Feminist 
Reflections on Qur'an, Hadith, and Jurisprudence, “The spectrum of Muslim engagements with 
interlocutors both Muslim and non-Muslim is vast...There is no one Muslim perspective on 
anything. Even among madrassa-educated scholars...one finds a spectrum of views ranging 
from enlightened to obscurantist.67” This paradigm of how the Islamic faith is practiced when 
freed of the arguably artificial mitigating factors created by the unique political dynamics of 
the traditionally-defined Islamic world raises a question of to what degree the apparent 
opposition to liberal values is actually a product of the Islamic faith, and to what degree it is 
generated by the specific modern political context of the region. It should be noted that large 
portions of the Islamic world had, in prior eras, a social dynamic that was extremely different 
than exists in much of the Islamic world today and an interpretation of Shari'a law that is more 
in keeping with modern liberal values. 
It is arguable that the current lag in the development of liberal thought in the modern 
Islamic world, and the fundamentalism that is so stereotypical of some modern Islamic states 
such as Saudi Arabia represents only a negative extreme of the form that t a Shari'a system 
may take. During the Golden Age of Islam, (circa 780-1260 CE), many regions of the Islamic 
world, operating under their respective understandings of the Shari'a law tradition, were 
notable for their comparatively high degree of tolerance and what might be considered more 
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liberal thought, certainly compared to their non-Islamic peers of the era, but to a certain 
extent, also some of their counterparts in the Islamic world of today. The Fatimid Empire, 
which stretched from southern Spain to North Africa and the Middle East, was one of the few 
societies of the era to allow for a degree of freedom of expression and religion, with 
Christians, Jews, and others being free to practice their faith under the Fatimid reading of 
Shari'a law.68 
Likewise, during this period of Islamic history, to facilitate the practice of debate under 
the tradition of ijtihād, scholars and philosophers with diverse philosophies and viewpoints 
were subsidized by the Fatimid government, along with translators who recovered and 
preserved the works of pagan philosophers from Greece, Rome, and other earlier civilizations, 
storing them in a large library in Baghdad.69 This stands in stark contrast to the practices of 
some authoritarian regimes and organizations in certain areas of the modern Islamic world, 
which attempt to preserve their own political and ideological legitimacy by iconoclastically 
attacking and suppressing the achievements of earlier cultures, most notoriously 
demonstrated by the Taliban's demolition of ancient Buddhist statues in Afghanistan in 2001.70 
Due to the comparatively high level of freedom of expression and thought, the Golden 
Age of Islam produced varying perspectives and theories about how the Islamic faith is most 
appropriately practiced, frequently with the emphasis on the acquisition of scientific and 
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philosophical knowledge that characterized much of Islamic culture. Indeed, the emphasis on 
a narrow understanding of Islamic orthodoxy that characterizes the practice of Shari'a in some 
modern regimes like Saudi Arabia was notably absent from Islamic philosophical practice of 
the Golden Age era, and some of the myriad of religious theories even incorporated 
farsighted scientific ideas that would not debut in modern Western science until the after 
industrial Revolution and would certainly be condemned as heterodox by certain Islamic 
regimes today. For instance, Islamic Golden-Age thinker and theological commentator Ibn 
Khaldun (1332-1406), writing in his famous work the Muqaddimah some 432 years before the 
birth of Charles Darwin, theorized that humans evolved from lower primates in an incremental 
divine plan: 
One should then take a look at the world of creation. It started out from the 
minerals and progressed, in an ingenious, gradual manner, to plants and 
animals...The last stage of plants, such as palms and vines, is connected with the 
first stage of animals, such as snails and shellfish...The animal world then widens, 
its species become numerous, and, in a gradual process of creation, it finally 
leads to man, who is able to think and reflect. The higher stage of man is 
reached from the world of monkeys.71 
This example serves to emphasize the radical differences in freedom of thought, expression, 
and belief that is possible under more liberal readings of Shari'a. Far from the dogmatic 
suppression of alternative theological thought so characteristic of Shari'a law in regimes such 
as Saudi Arabia, some historical Islamic societies operating under the tradition of ijtihād gave 
                                                 
71 Kiros, Teodros. Explorations in African Political Thought. 2001 . 
48 
 
rise to alternative understandings of Islamic thought, facilitated by a degree of free expression 
that was not generally characteristic of the era. 
Ultimately, while some contemporary Islamic fundamentalists indisputably cite Shari'a 
law as a justification for violence and the abuse of human rights, the historical record attests 
to the fact that these circumstances are not inevitable in Islamic societies. In an Islamic society 
where members of the faith are permitted to participate in the tradition of debate and 
discussion of Muslim theological thought, it may be expected that a wider diversity of 
religious interpretations and perspectives will arise, and, if the philosophical tradition is 
observed, coexist. While fundamentalism is a phenomenon that occurs within religions and 
religious societies, the broader political context is a major deciding factor on the 
predominance of fundamentalist religious perspectives in certain areas; that is, political 
structures may deliberately encourage and nurture the growth of certain radical religious 
perspectives, if, as previously stated, it serves the purpose of that regime. 
Indeed, in the case of Saudi Arabia, the connection between the notoriously decadent 
House of Saud and the austere followers of the Wahhabi sect was not coincidental. Their 
alliance is a political one that dates back to the mid-1700s, when the Saud clan formed an 
agreement with Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab, the founder of the Wahhabi sect, whereby 
he agreed to imbue their territorial ambitions with the theological legitimacy of his sect, and 
they in return would provide the Wahhabi sect with a political power base and social 
influence;72 the three-century old symbiotic relationship between the Saudi royal family and 
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the Wahhabists provides an archetypical example of how a fundamentalist religious sect can 
be propped up by the government. In return, as previously mentioned, the Wahhabist mufti 
continue to lend a certain theological legitimacy to the House of Saud, while they also 
generally choose to tolerate the decadence and materialism which has caused other 
fundamentalists to turn against the Saudi royal family. While the values of the political regime 
and the predominant fundamentalist sect are thoroughly at odds with one another, members 
of both groups choose to overlook this discrepancy in the name of deriving a mutual benefit. 
In societies where the government does not rely upon a specific faith or sect to 
establish its legitimacy, fundamentalists are arguably less likely to take hold in the manner as 
the Wahhabists have in Saudi Arabia, and impose their own specific interpretation of the 
Shari'a law tradition. Ultimately, then, it appears that Islam or Shari'a themselves are not the 
chief causes of the growth of fundamentalism, but, as previously argued, it is political 
structures that lack inherent legitimacy that attempt to manufacture it through the promotion 
of fundamentalism, drawing upon autocratic understandings of Shari'a that serve to underpin 
their autocratic political practices. Furthermore, this offers broader implications for the 
relationship between religion and the state---when not interfered with to by the interest of a 
state that lacks inherent legitimacy, Shari'a, and possibly other religious traditions as well, tend 
to conform within the moderate spectrum of the political context they exist within. 
VI: Conclusions 
(i). Future Prospects for Shari'a in the West. 




Given the current political dynamics and numerous ongoing political crises involving 
the Islamic world, the future of Shari'a in Western democracies is mixed. In Canada, if the 
elimination of religious courts in Ontario precipitates a general ban in the coming years, 
Shari'a courts in that nation may see an abrupt end. In any case, the example of Ontario 
demonstrated that the prospects of Shari'a in Canada may be bleaker than elsewhere in the 
West. Likewise, the rise of nationalist sentiment in the United Kingdom, combined with Brexit, 
may pose a challenge to the existence of Shari'a tribunals, as campaigns against them 
continue; unlike in Canada, however, there are few indicators in the United Kingdom of an 
immediate legal threat to the continued operation of Shari'a courts. 
In the United States, the state legislatures of many states have voiced their displeasure 
to the presence of Shari'a in any context of the legal system by passing laws attempting to 
ban foreign or religious law from state courtrooms. However, courtrooms relying upon the 
legal doctrine of neutral principles tend to sidestep First Amendment concerns by focusing on 
the contractual aspects of religious arbitration agreements, treating them like any other 
agreements. Furthermore, the two pronged legitimacy offered by case law and the Federal 
Arbitration Act would appear to indicate that arbitration courts, Shari'a courts included, are 
likely to be a part of the U.S. legal landscape for years to come. 
(ii) Broader Implications 
The conclusions reached over the course of this project raise a number of further 
questions regarding the interaction between religion and politics. Most saliently, while it 
appears that Islamic religious practice, in general, is greatly shaped and impacted by the 
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research of this project is somewhat limited at this juncture by focusing on the Islamic faith 
alone, as per its objective of analyzing whether or not Shari'a arbitration courts are consonant 
with democratic principles. A more comprehensive analysis of this paradigm between religion 
and politics would require an examination of other faiths in their respective political contexts. 
However, assuming that the relationship between Islamic conceptions of law and the values of 
the government it exists in holds true across other faiths, a hypothesis could be advanced that 
widespread religious radicalism of any variety could be prevented through political 
moderation. 
(iii). Are Shari'a Courts Compatible with Secular Democracies? 
Taking into consideration the wide diversity of religious perspectives falling under the 
umbrella of Shari'a law in the Islamic faith, and the legal traditions of the Western nations 
examined, Shari'a courts are arguably compatible with secular constitutional democracies, 
provided that they receive the proper oversight due to all arbitration courts to ensure their 
rulings are in accordance with the laws of the nation they operate in, and the parties whose 
cases are heard in the Shari'a court are recoursing to it of their own free will. Historical 
examples and modern diversity of thought within Islam demonstrate that fundamentalist 
values are not inevitable within Shari'a systems, and that those existing within more moderate 
political contexts tend to show more diversity of thought and ideological moderation than 
those existing in more extremist political contexts. Shari'a arbitration courts, if properly 
monitored by the authorities, should present few difficulties to a secular democratic system. 
Where the flexible religious system that is Shari'a law exists in a moderate democratic political 
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context, it is likely to conform more to that political system than impact it. 
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